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Abstract 
Our objective is to determine the variables that explain the armed activity of irregular groups 
since the mid-1970s and to establish the possible causes of their expansion up to 2002, 
especially in terms of decentralisation (understood as the increased political, budgetary and 
administrative autonomy of local government). Over the past 30 years, Colombia has 
experienced profound changes at an economic, social and institutional level.  Not only has the 
process of urbanisation been consolidated at the same time as the participation of agriculture 
in GDP has fallen, but the process of decentralisation has accelerated since the mid-1980s. 
We believe that decentralisation turned the conflict into a dispute for local power. This is 
manifested in the use of violence to gain control of public goods and services, to influence 
political and electoral results of interest to the irregular groups, and to consolidate local-
level territorial control. 
 
The analysis of early guerrilla activity (1974-1982) shows socio-economic factors (poverty, 
inequality) to be the greatest variables. However, from the mid-1980s guerrilla activity is 
linked to the process of decentralisation, which created incentives for irregular groups to 
consolidate local power bases via the use of violence. The State’s weakness in the monopoly 
of force and the administration of justice facilitated the guerrilla groups’ expansion and the 
intensification of their armed activities, as well as those of the illegal ‘self-defence groups’. 
The statistical and econometric results reveal a strong connection between the intensification 
of armed activities and local governments’ greater political independence and fiscal strength.  
  
This study used new historical data on the conflict, and new municipal economic, fiscal, 
social and political information. New IEPRI municipal information on the activities and 
actions of the different guerrilla groups (FARC, ELN, M-19) from 1974 to 1982 was used, as 
were municipal databases – belonging to the Social Foundation, the National Planning 
Department and the President’s Office – on the actions and attacks of guerrilla, ‘self-defence’ 
and criminal groups between 1985 and 2002. 
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Paul Faguet and the audience at the War, Democracy and Globalisation Seminar, organized by IEPRI and the 
Crisis State Research Centre, London School of Economics, for their comments. Some of the quantitative 
exercises were suggested by Alejandro Gaviria. We also give credit to our research assistants: Ana María Díaz, 
María del Mar Palau and Paloma López de Mesa. 
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Introduction  
“…the FARC are angry because they have not been able to do what they want 
with our politicians.”1 
 
The Colombian armed conflict is one of the oldest in the world; it is only superseded in time 
by the Israeli-Palestinian and India-Pakistan conflicts, and it is the only ongoing armed 
conflict in North and South America. The end of the Cold War did nothing to reduce the 
military capacity of Colombian guerrilla forces. In fact, in the early-1990s they escalated their 
activities (attacks, combat, intimidation, etcetera) to cover a greater proportion of Colombian 
territory. They financed their activities from a variety of different sources – kidnapping, 
extortion, illicit crops, theft of municipal funds – and became one of the “world’s most salient 
cases of the successful self-financing of insurgency”.2 At the same time, paramilitary or 
illegal self-defence groups appeared to combat the guerrilla groups; they also scaled up their 
activities during the 1990s, financing them from similar sources to those of the guerrilla 
groups. 
 
The objective of this paper is to explain the variables associated with the armed activities of 
irregular groups from the mid-1970s, and to determine the possible causes of their expansion 
until 2002. Over this 30 year period, Colombia experienced profound economic, social and 
institutional changes. Not only was the process of urbanisation consolidated at the same time 
as the participation of agriculture in GDP fell, but the process of decentralisation was 
accelerated. From the mid-1980s, regional and local governments had access to more 
resources, both their own and from transfers; and local politics was also transformed via the 
popular election of mayors.  
 
The decentralisation of local politics and public spending changed the State’s role, as much in 
terms of power as spending, and gave more political power to elected regional and local 
leaders, who now had greater budgetary autonomy. The new municipal and regional resources 
were spent largely in social areas (especially education, health and clean drinking water); and 
the institutional changes had a substantial impact on the dynamics of the internal armed 
conflict. As political power and budgetary resources became more local, the irregular groups 
had more of an incentive to exercise greater local control, especially due to the State’s 
weakness in the monopoly of force and the administration of justice. Thus, as the groups 
increased their local control – by intimidating, plundering and forming strategic alliances with 
local and regional leaders – they had access to a greater proportion of power. The objective of 
this paper is to understand and quantify these changes in the dynamics of the Colombian 
armed conflict. 
 
This document is divided into five sections, the first being this introduction. The second 
describes the temporal and geographical evolution of the Colombian conflict from 1974 to 
2002. The third looks into the possible links between the conflict and decentralisation. The 
fourth deals with the econometric evidence and quantitative exercises carried out on the 
variables related to armed activity and its expansion. In the fifth section we present our 
conclusions. 
 
                                                
1 Declaration by one of the councillors who survived the massacre perpetrated by the FARC in the Puerto Rico, 
Caquetá, Municipal Council on May 24, 2005. 
2 Alfredo Rangel, Guerra Insurgente. Conflictos en Malasia, Perú, Filipinas, El Salvador y Colombia, Bogotá: 
Intermedio Editores, 2001. 
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To reach an understanding of the long-term evolution of the armed conflict, we used new 
historical data, and new municipal economic, fiscal, social and political information. New 
IEPRI municipal information on the activities and actions of the different guerrilla groups 
(FARC, ELN, M-19) from 1974 to 1982 was used,3 as were municipal databases (belonging 
to the Social Foundation, the National Planning Department and the President’s Office) 
related to the actions and attacks of guerrilla, ‘self-defence’ and criminal groups between 
1985 and 2002. During the quantitative exercises we combined this information with census 
data from 1973, 1985 and 1993, municipal fiscal accounts held by the National Audit Office 
and the National Planning Department, electoral information from the National Electoral 
Database, land ownership data from the Agustín Codazzi Geographical Institute, educational 
statistics from the Ministry of Education and the DANE, and criminal statistics from the 
National Police Force. 
  
 
The Geography and Evolution of the Conflict  
The activities of irregular groups increased significantly during the second half of the 1980s 
(Graph 1), both in terms of armed activity (more attacks) and geographical expansion. Map 1 
shows the municipalities in which an armed group was active between 1974 and 1978. The 
total, 91 municipalities, is only a little more than 8% of the total number of municipalities at 
the time, a sharp contrast with the current percentage of municipalities affected by illegal 
armed activity.4  
 
Graph 1. Armed activity: FARC, ELN and AUC, 1974 - 2002 
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Additionally, the characteristics of these municipalities have changed over time. Initially the 
illegal groups concentrated their activities on regions undergoing colonization – far from the 
country’s economic centres and in which there was a clear relationship between poverty, state 
                                                
3 The information was collected from the following newspapers: El Tiempo (Bogotá), El Colombiano (Medellín), 
El País (Cali), La Patria (Manizales) and Vanguardia Liberal (Bucaramanga).    
4 According to DNP data for 2002, 33.6% of Colombian municipalities experienced FARC activity,  11% ELN 
activity, l 7% AUC activity, and 41% actions by all three groups. 
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absence and a guerrilla presence.5 From the 1980s, however, the location of guerrilla 
concentrations changed. They relocated to strategic zones with an abundance of natural 
resources and huge economic potential:6 
the expansion of guerrilla groups over the past decade is directly related to 
controlling the production of diverse riches: areas dedicated to the production and 
processing of illicit drugs, zones rich in gold, coal, oil, bananas, cattle and coffee.7 
  
Map 1. Armed Activities of Illegal Groups: 1974 - 1978 
 
                                       
Source: IEPRI Database 
* FARC, ELN, EPL, M-19 and Nacional Liberation Front (FLN) activity, as well as movements such as the 
United Revolutionary Forces of Colombia, the Red Guard, MAS, the ORP and the MAO.  
** Activities referred to are: attacks on population centres, threats, extortion, kidnapping, attacks on military 
installations and oil pipelines, ambushes and terrorist attacks. 
 
We analysed the variables associated with illegal armed activity using the hypothesis that the 
expansion of the armed conflict was linked to the specific strategic objectives of each illegal 
armed group. Achieving these objectives depended on the groups’ finances and the 
institutional framework and state actions designed to stop them. The decentralisation of 
politics and spending was an institutional change that allowed the irregular groups to win new 
territorial influence by intimidating or forming alliances with political and local power 
groups, and to take control of the growing municipal resources (both local and from 
transfers).8 
 
To obtain a clear idea of the conflict’s dynamics one must differentiate between the groups. 
Each has its own strategic objectives, expressed by the different temporal and geographical 
                                                
5 Eduardo Pizarro, Una Democracia Asediada. Balance y Perspectivas del Conflicto Armado en Colombia, 
Bogotá: Norma, 2004. 
6 According to Halvard Habaug & Scout Gates, ‘The Geography of Civil War’, Peace Research (2002), if an 
armed conflict is about winning power, then armed activity should move into the centres of economic power (the 
capital). The length of this process depends on the size of the country and its geography (climate, topography). 
7 Pizarro (2004), p.185. 
8 See Mauricio Rubio, ‘Conflicto y finanzas públicas municipales’, Documento CEDE No. 2002-17, Bogotá: 
CEDE-Universidad de los Andes, 2002. 
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expansion dynamics. The next section offers a brief account of the appearance and evolution 
of the most important illegal armed groups today (FARC, ELN and AUC).  
 
The FARC’s Evolution and Expansion  
The origins of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) are rooted in the 1950s. 
A number of peasant self-defence groups, under the influence of the Communist Party, 
appeared in areas such as southern Tolima, Sumapaz and the Llanos Orientales.9 These 
groups were a direct response to political violence perpetrated by the Conservative 
Government during the era of partisan conflict known as la Violencia. Following the bombing 
of Marquetalia by the army in 1963 and 1964, the peasant self-defence forces transformed 
into the guerrilla movement, first represented by the Bloque Sur following the 1964 Primera 
Conferencia Guerrillera (First Guerrilla Conference).10 
 
During this first conference a balance was calculated of actions carried out; guaranteeing the 
movement’s durability was the central objective. Military and organisational action plans 
were drawn-up and the movement became a mobile guerrilla force. The Second Conference 
was held in 1966, and the Bloque Sur became the FARC and decided to expand their armed 
activities to other areas of the country in a guerrilla war. Six new guerrilla nuclei were formed 
and the reactive defence strategy was replaced by a long-term direct offensive conflict 
strategy with the final objective of winning power. 
 
The Third Conference was held in Guayabero in March 1969. Discussions centred around the 
formation of blocks, and combat zones were established (respecting those already in place). 
Five years later the Fifth Conference was held in Meta, and the result was the constitution of a 
revolutionary army. FARC activity was limited to the local sphere during the 1960s, 
especially municipalities where they had become local leaders and the source of order due to a 
low or non-existent state presence. These were usually zones of colonisation in which 
agrarian disputes persisted. The Sixth Conference, held in 1978, established priorities as 
regards training militants, strengthening the Revolutionary Council and increasing the number 
of fronts to a level of one in every department.11  
 
Four years later the FARC, now an organisation with 1,000 men divided into ten fronts, 
redefined their long-term objectives to include the accelerated recruitment of militants, the 
formation of new fronts, the urbanisation of the conflict, and a military attack strategy. These 
objectives were ratified at the Seventh Conference in 1982. This meeting, according to many 
authors, marked a historic point in FARC history. Here began the accelerated increase in the 
number of fronts and the unprecedented expansion of their armed activities (see Maps 1, 2 
                                                
9 Juliana Mejía, ‘El origen de las FARC’, mimeo, 2002. 
10 M. A.Vélez, ‘FARC-ELN. Evolución y expansión territorial’, Documento CEDE, Bogotá: CEDE-Universidad 
de los Andes, 2002. In 1964, under President Guillermo León Valencia, the army entered Marquetalia, El Pato, 
Guayabero and other regions, with the objective of wiping-out the guerrilla groups active there. “The guerrilla 
resistance in Marquetalia lasted until the end of 1965. During Operación Marquetalia, commanded by General 
Hernando Correa and co-ordinated by Colonel José Joaquín Matallana, 16 thousand soldiers entered the region 
with the idea of exterminating thousands of guerrilla fighters living there. The FARC appeared on May 27th that 
year as a result of the military actions in the independent republics. On June 20 an assembly was held to decide 
on the first tactical and strategic lines of the mobile guerrilla forces, and give impulse to concrete plans of attack. 
They were 48 men. They approved the Agrarian Programme of the Revolutionary Movement and the 
Revolutionary Guerrilla Forces” (Mejía, 2002). 
11 Vélez (2000). 
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and 3):12  “[t]he organisation went from ten fronts at the end of the 1970s, to 26 during the 
first three years of the 1980s”.13  
                                                                                                                                                                            
  
Maps 2, 3 and 4: The Evolution of FARC Activity 
              
 1985         1990                                            2000   
  
              
   
Source: Social Foundation, National Planning Department 
 
The Seventh Conference was a strategic turning point for the organisation, and led to new 
patterns of armed activity and attacks – the urbanisation of the conflict, the increase to 48 
fronts, the identification of the Cordillera Central (Central Mountain Range) as the base for 
expansion, the creation of means of financing to support the expansion process, and the 
massive use of politics to win more popular support.14 
  
There are various reasons behind the geographical expansion of FARC activity, the first of 
which being the existence of stable and lucrative sources of financing.15 Amongst their 
principal income sources were: the plundering of productive activities (oil, coal, gold, 
manufacturing, energy, transport, etcetera), the bleeding of municipal finances (direct 
extortion or redirecting local investment), kidnapping and the drug trade. In regions where 
illegal drugs were produced the FARC established a ‘tax system’ that covered all level of 
production (cultivation, processing and trafficking).   
 
The FARC achieved the goals of the Seventh Conference and created fronts throughout 
Colombia; their strategic deployment axis being the Cordillera Oriental (Eastern Mountain 
                                                
12 For a rigorous analysis of the FARC’s geographical expansion see Camilo Echandía, Geografía del conflicto 
armado y las manifestaciones de la violencia en Colombia, Bogotá: Vice President’s Office, 1999.  
13 Rodolfo Escobedo, Los frentes de las Farc, Bogotá: Presidency, Peace Council, Observatory of Violence, 
1992. 
14 According to Lair, the FARC, and other groups, experienced an unprecedented qualitative and quantitative 
jump, or “strategic rupture”, at the start of the 1980s – huge increases in the number of fronts, geographical 
dissemination via a “centrifugal logic” and  the control of municipal life. The second “strategic rupture” occurred 
following the army’s attack on the Casa Verde (Green House) in 1990 (Eric Lair, ‘Transformaciones y fluidez de 
la guerra en Colombia. Un enfoque militar’, in Gonzalo Sánchez and Eric Lair (eds), Violencias y Estrategias 
Colectivas en la Región Andina, Bogotá: IFEA- Editorial Norma, Colección Vitral, 2004).  
15 J. Salazar, ‘La financiación de la FARC: Un resultado de su estrategia guerrillera’, Masters thesis, PEG-
Department of Economics, Universidad de Los Andes, 2005. 
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Range).16 This allowed them to expand their influence to highly strategic zones with huge 
potential economic reserves. The FARC achieved important military victories in Las Delicias 
(Caquetá) and El Billar (Caquetá), where they displayed a sophisticated capacity for attack.17 
The FARC presence in the cities also increased via the Milicias Bolivarianas (Bolivarian 
Militias) – their urban networks. 
 
However, there were also political and military failures during the FARC’s territorial 
expansion. The strategic, highly mobile units of war capable of attacking and annihilating 
military bases and defending strategic territories,18 approved by the Eighth Conference 
(1993), suffered following the modernisation of the armed forces during the Pastrana 
Administration (1998-2002). This modernisation – basically the strengthening of infantry 
brigades and military aviation, and the evolution of communications – allowed the army to 
retake the military initiative and obliged the FARC to go back to their strategy of guerrilla 
warfare.19 In addition, the FARC have little political power and are viewed negatively by 
large sectors of society. This view has extended to include the international arena (the group 
is on US and EU terrorist lists). 
 
The balance of the Uribe Administration’s first two years reveals new tendencies of war in 
Colombia, and there is evidence of a new guerrilla tactic. According to statistics presented by 
the Security and Democracy Foundation, the groups are recurring to ever more ambushes and 
anti-personnel mines (attacks against troops), and are attacking military and police posts and 
bases less.20 This reflects a regression from the march towards a war of movements in the 
early 1990s, to a conventional guerrilla war since 1998. 
 
The ELN’s Evolution and Expansion  
A group of Colombian students inspired by Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara’s teoría foquista, formed 
the Brigada José Antonio Galán in 1962 in Havana, with a view to founding mobile guerrilla 
groups in Colombia. Two years later the Brigada José Antonio Galán became the National 
Liberation Army (ELN). Following the taking of Simacota in 1965 the ELN issued their 
manifesto, which included the working classes winning power and the fight against the 
Colombian oligarchy and North American imperialism. The ELN's first power bases were the 
jungle and frontier zones in south Santander, Bolivar and north-east Antioquia. The first 
stages of the group’s evolution were characterised by slow growth in the ranks, who operated 
in small, focused guerrilla groups and carried out “easy ambushes on the army and attacked 
small police stations”.21  
 
During these years the group’s finances were weak, coming principally from peasant 
contributions, the theft of public sector payrolls and raids on the Caja Agraria (Agrarian 
                                                
16 Echandía (1999). 
17 Rafael Pardo, La  Historia de la Guerras, Bogotá: Ediciones B Colombia, 2004. 
18 A war of movements consists of carrying out semi-regular operations against state forces over long periods of 
time, or attacking strategic military installations. This strategy comes before the war of positions, when cities are 
attacked and power is won. 
19 Rangel (2001); Pardo (2004). 
20 Security and Democracy Foundation, Coyuntura de Seguridad. Informe Especial. Colombia: Balance de 
Seguridad 2001-2004, Bogotá: Fundación Seguridad y Democracia, 2004. 
21 Andrés Peñate, ‘El sendero estratégico del ELN: del idealismo guevarista al clientelismo armado’, Documento 
de Trabajo, 15, Bogotá: Programme of Studies in Security, Justice and Violence, Universidad de los Andes, 
1997. 
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Bank), and they constantly had to pull-back to new areas of the country.22 The ELN’s stable 
growth was interrupted in 1973 when they suffered serious defeats at the hands of the 
military23. These defeats almost led to the group’s extinction; in just one year the number of 
troops fell from 270 to 70.24 The period from 1973 to 1983 was one of crisis for the ELN, and 
forced changes to the foquista model and a restructure at the highest levels of the 
organisation. In 1983, the ELN held the National Meeting for the Heroes and Martyrs of 
Anorí, at which they designed new strategies aimed at reviving the group. Some of the 
strategies had already been used successfully by the FARC (increasing and expanding war 
fronts and looking for new sources of financing), and they included the fact that the support of 
the population is fundamental to the success of expansionist policies.  
 
Graph 2. ELN Troops and Fronts 
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Similar to the FARC, the ELN developed an organisational structure capable of collecting and 
investing the enormous economic resources that would allow the movement to recover and 
expand (Graph 2). The Domingo Laín front, operating in the Sarare Jungle in Piedemonte 
Llanero, was the first to kidnap cattle ranchers and hold the big oil companies to ransom, the 
first of which were the foreign companies constructing the Caño Limon–Coveñas oil pipeline. 
The ELN began to occupy zones with great economic potential, especially those with large-
scale energy and mining projects from which the group could obtain resources. Amongst 
these zones are Arauca, Casanare, Barrancabermeja, Guajira and Cesar.25 
 
This strategy led to rapid growth in the 1980s. The movement went from having 350 men in 
four fronts in 1984, to 4,500 men in 41 fronts in 2000, allowing them to extend their armed 
activities to new regions of Colombia (Maps 5, 6 and 7). Despite their inferior numbers, the 
                                                
22 Carlos Medina, ‘Violencia y lucha armada: el caso del ELN. Una historia de vida (1963-1978)’, PhD thesis, 
Departamento de Historia. Universidad Nacional de Colombia, 1997. 
23 One of the most important happened in Anorí, Antioquia, in 1973, when the army killed 90 guerrilla fighters, 
including a number of the organisation’s leaders.    
24 Medina (1997). 
25 Peñate (1997). 
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ELN has been responsible for the same number of kidnappings as the FARC,26 and their 
actions have extended into the cities via popular militias. However, over recent years the 
ELN’s military capacity has been damaged and its areas of influence have shrunk under 
pressure from paramilitary groups and the FARC. In cities like Barrancabermeja and Cúcuta 
the ELN has lost its influence in the face of AUC activity. The ELN also gave the FARC 
control of their territories of influence on the Venezuelan border and the strategic corridor 
linking north-east Colombia with the Atlantic coast.27  
 
 
Maps 5, 6 and 7. The Evolution of ELN Activity 
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Source: Social Foundation and National Planning Department 
 
 
The Evolution and Expansion of Paramilitary and Self-Defence Groups 
Today’s paramilitary (self-defence) groups were formed at the start of the 1980s, when the 
Betancourt Administration (1982-1986) passed amnesty and pardon laws and decided to 
commence peace talks with the armed groups.28 Medina, in his investigation into the rise of 
paramilitary groups in Puerto Boyacá, explains how the concessions granted by the 
Government as part of its peace policy were not well received in the region.29 Landowners 
and cattle ranchers who had been besieged by the guerrilla groups decided to form self-
defence groups who would fight subversion alongside the army. Various self-defence groups 
sprang up around the country as a response to the guerrilla groups’ extortion and 
                                                
26 Peñate (1997) explains this by noting that the ELN was the first guerrilla group to use extortive kidnapping, 
and was thus the first to learn the secrets and advantages of this criminal practice. 
27 This is why some authors have stated that the ELN is facing imminent military defeat, and are thus exploring 
the political arena with their proposal (la Convención Nacional) for an eventual peace process with the 
Government (Pizarro, 2004).  
28 Law 35/1982 offered amnesty to the authors of political crimes (rebellion, sedition and political violence) and 
authorised financing for rehabilitation and reinsertion programmes for fighters, including land rights and 
education. Law 49/1985 authorised the President to pardon people condemned of these crimes, with the 
possibility of extending the pardon to related crimes. 
29 Carlos Medina, Autodefensas, Paramilitares y Narcotráfico en Colombia, Bogotá: Documentos Periodísticos, 
1990. 
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kidnapping.30 All these groups had a common component at the start – they were financed by 
regional elites and some of their members were also members of the armed forces. Between 
1994 and 1997, the groups underwent a process of unification, which led to the creation of the 
United Self-Defence Forces of Colombia (AUC), a movement unified under one command 
group made up of regional leaders. 
 
By the end of the 1990s, paramilitary and self-defence groups were active all over Colombia, 
having achieved great mobility and offensive power.31 According to the UNDP, by 2002 there 
were 22 paramilitary groups in Colombia operating in 28 departments. The number of AUC 
fighters also grew fast, from 3,800 in 1997 to 13,000  in 2003, reflecting the organisation’s 
strategy to extend its influence into all areas where guerrilla forces were in control (Maps 8 
and 9). The AUC began a fight for strategic zones of economic importance to the guerrilla 
forces, such as coca-growing areas in Urabá, Putumayo and south Bolívar and cities like 
Barrancabermeja and Cúcuta.  
 
According to Lair, from the 1980s paramilitary groups fought to win control of the 
populations, resources and strategic corridors of the different illegal groups.32 They did not 
limit themselves to defensive activities but went on a political-military offensive, pursuing 
and attacking guerrilla forces in their own areas of influence. To gain control of these zones 
the AUC carried out selective assassinations and massacres (Graph 3) with a view to 
eliminating the guerrilla groups’ social support base in the regions.33 The AUC are the group 
most connected to massacres and collective assassinations. 
 
Maps 8 and 9. The Evolution of Paramilitary and Self-Defence Group Activities 
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30 Including the Castaño brothers’ Autodefensas de Córdoba y Urabá; the Autodefensas de Ramón Isaza in 
Magdalena Medio; the San Martin, Meta, Rice Growers’ Armed Groups; the Santander Cattle Ranchers and 
Traders’ Self-Defence Forces; the armed forces of engineers in the Valle del Cauca; the Autodefensas de 
Cundinamarca commanded by el Águila; and the armed groups of drug-traffickers in Arauca, Putumayo and 
Caquetá. 
31 There is a brief history of self-defence and paramilitary forces in Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence, The 
Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia, New York: State University of New York Press, 2002. 
32 Lair (2004). 
33 Mauricio Romero, Paramilitares y Autodefensas 1982-2003, Bogotá: Planeta, 2003. 
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Graph 3. Massacres Committed by Illegal Armed Groups, 1997-200334 
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Source: Human Rights Observatory, Vice President’s Office. 
 
The AUC has achieved a high level of regional and local influence, both in terms of politics 
and the use of public sector resources. It has also won an important level of control of coca 
crops and drug trafficking in Putumayo, Nariño and the Caribbean coast, which has multiplied 
the AUC’s financial capacity.35 As well as being one of the greatest perpetrators of violence 
against the civilian population, the AUC was an obstacle to peace during the Caguán 
negotiations between the FARC and the State.36 
 
The AUC are currently in negotiations with the Government, with a view to ceasing hostilities 
and demobilising. They are demanding recognition as an independent political movement, but 
links with the drug trade and criminal practices are hampering the negotiations.37                       
 
 
The State, Decentralisation and Conflict 
Until recently the principal hypothesis used to explain the expansion and consolidation of 
illegal groups, principally guerrilla forces, was the weakness of the Colombian State. 
Especially in rural areas, the State was quite simply unable to offer social services and basic 
public goods such as education, health and public services. It was also failing in the provision 
of justice and the protection of basic human rights. This lack of public and social services fed 
popular discontent and, in the long-term, led to guerrilla activity. This hypothesis has, 
                                                
34 A massacre is considered to be the killing of more than four people in the same place at the same time. 
35 Ana Maria Díaz & Fabio Sánchez, ‘Geografía de los cultivos ilícitos y conflicto armado en Colombia’, 
Documento CEDE No. 2004-18, Bogotá: CEDE-Universidad de los Andes, 2004. 
36 During the peace negotiations between the FARC and the Pastrana Administration, (1998-2002), the FARC 
suspended the dialogue on various occasions citing poor results in the Government’s fight against 
paramilitarism. 
37 Pizarro (2004). 
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however, been called into question by recent research.38 It would appear that state presence 
has a low influence on the expansion of armed activity. The research sustains that, 
independent of state presence, the conflict has expanded in more urbanised municipalities 
with important natural resources and high levels of economic activity.39  
 
Nevertheless, it is not enough to explain the conflict by stating that it has obeyed a pattern of 
greed and grievance.40 Any explanation must include the institutional changes implemented 
by the State.41 The evolution and expansion of conflict in despotic, centralised countries is not 
the same as its development in countries that have opted for greater decentralisation and 
political openness. The latter, paradoxically, offers more financing and expansion 
opportunities to irregular groups. The reason is twofold: on the one hand, local governments 
have less repressive capacity than the central government so local leaders are more 
susceptible to intimidation, and on the other, as more resources are transferred to local 
governments the ‘pot’ available for plundering increases. Decentralisation is, therefore, an 
opportunity to widen political influences and increase sources of financing.  
 
The next section details the most relevant aspects of decentralisation in Colombia since the  
mid-1980s. We show how decentralisation reduced the role of the so-called ‘objective 
conditions’ of the conflict by generating unprecedented advances in social indicators, but that 
it also gave irregular groups new territorial control and finance opportunities.  
 
Decentralisation in Colombia: Objectives and Advances 
The process of decentralisation in Colombia began in the mid-1980s. Its objectives were to 
increase the provision of local public goods and services and to strengthen municipal-level 
democracy. From the outset political decentralisation was combined with administrative 
decentralisation. Until the start of the 1980s, the Colombian State was highly centralised. 
Spending decisions were taken by central government agencies and Congress acted as the 
mediator between the Government and the regions. The initial proposal for decentralisation 
focused on three areas: politics, economics and administration. 
 
The political component of decentralisation was designed to improve the closed political 
structure, characterised by the exclusion of broad sectors and political movements.42 
According to the National Planning Department, the political component had three objectives: 
to consolidate democracy; to develop participative, direct democracy; and to increase 
governability.43 The process hoped to bring government closer to the people, improve 
institutional capacity, combat corruption and increase the margin of governability. In addition, 
as regards the development of participative democracy, it was hoped that the bipartisan 
                                                
38 See Martha Bottia, ‘La presencia y expansión municipal de las FARC: es avaricia y contagio, mas que 
ausencia estatal’, Documento CEDE No. 2003-03, Bogotá: CEDE-Universidad de los Andes, 2003; Rubio 
(2002); Echandía (1999). 
39 Bottia (2003); Salazar (2005). 
40 Paul Collier, Greed and Grievance in Civil Wars, Washington DC: World Bank, 2000. 
41 Medina has criticised the ‘offer’ version of conflict proposed by Collier (2000), in part because violence and 
conflict can have “multiple equilibriums”, which implies that transversal cut analyses are not only incomplete, 
but are wrong. However, a historical analysis of irregular groups and the institutional framework surrounding 
their actions, and the strategy of comparing similar municipalities, have enabled us to overcome this criticism 
(Luis Medina, ‘A Critique of the “Resource based” Theory of the Colombia’s Civil War’, paper presented at the 
Latin American Studies Association conference, Las Vegas, October 2004). 
42 Diana Hoyos & Marcela Ceballos, ‘Tendencias electorales bajo la descentralización, 1998-2002’, Crisis States 
Working Papers, 57, London: Crisis States Research Centre, London School of Economics, 2004. 
43 National Planning Department, Evaluación de la descentralización, 3 vols, Bogotá: Departamento Nacional de 
Planeación, 2002a. 
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tradition would be eliminated and the participation of non-traditional political parties 
increased. 
 
Another component was administrative decentralization. According to the National Planning 
Department, the idea was to improve the distribution of functions amongst different 
administrative levels using the following criteria: the assignation and provision of municipal 
public goods; departmental tracking and control; and the definition and design of central 
government policies and strategies.44  
 
Administrative decentralisation gave local authorities the right to draw up and execute 
budgets, plan activities, authorise spending and sign contracts. In spite of the budgetary limits 
the process imposed, in many municipalities with a high presence of illegal groups the 
initiative became a lucrative alternative under the new system of “armed clientelism”.45 The 
fiscal decentralisation initiative included reforms aimed at guaranteeing a minimum level of 
resources for local agencies, to enable them to carry out their new roles. Automatic and semi-
automatic transfers from central government were increased, resources were reassigned and 
new sectors were created for local development.46 
 
For analytical purposes there follows an explanation of the two stage evolution of 
decentralisation. The first stage, in the 1980s, was made up of a set of fiscal measures aimed 
at reorganising and strengthening local finances. The second, following the 1991 Constitution, 
gave new impulse to the process of decentralisation and made Colombia one of the most 
decentralised States in Latin America. The second stage was completed in the 1990s with a 
set of fiscal reforms that further developed the Constitution and replanted some of its articles. 
 
1. The First Stage: the popular election of mayors 
Decentralisation during the 1980s was characterised by a weak social and economic 
democracy that, in turn, made it difficult to strengthen politics. In addition, the army had lost 
its monopoly of force, and drug trafficking had severely weakened the justice system.47 Local 
governments had a low capacity to act due to their weak fiscal base, low margin of political 
manoeuvrability, and slow progress regards social indicators (seen in  the low coverage of 
social and public services). One must also add the presence of illegal armed groups, who 
constituted a sort of ‘embryonic State’ in regions with minimal or no state presence.48  
 
The popular election of mayors from 1988 was one of the first, and most important, advances 
in political decentralisation. The first stage of decentralisation followed an integral strategy 
that combined physical, political and administrative changes, with a view to generating a 
significant impact on the fundamental problem of legitimacy.  
 
                                                
44 National Planning Department, Hacia un Estado Comunitario, Plan National de Desarrollo (2002-2006), 
Bogotá: Departamento Nacional de Planeación, 2002b. 
45 Pizarro (2004). 
46 DNP (2002b). The re-assignation of resources for local development, including the creation of new public-
sectors. Importance was given to the provision of drinking water, basic sanitation, culture, recreation, sport and 
subsidised housing, amongst others. 
47 Fabio Sánchez & Jairo Núñez, ‘Determinantes del Crimen Violento en un país altamente violento: el caso de 
Colombia’, in Economía, Crimen y Conflicto, Bogotá: Universidad National de Colombia, 2000; Juan Carlos 
Echeverry & Partow Zeinab, ‘Por qué la justiciano responde al crimen: el caso de la cocaína en Colombia’, in 
Mauricio Cárdenas & Roberto Steiner (eds), Corrupción, Crimen y Justicia. Una perspectiva económica, 
Bogotá: TM Editores, LACEA, 1998. 
48 See Hoyos & Ceballos (2004). 
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2. The Second Stage: The 1991 Constitution and Increased Decentralisation  
The 1991 Constitution formalised transfers to local governments and the popular election of 
mayors and governors, and laid the foundations of increased decentralisation, especially in 
terms of higher resource allocation for local governments.  This stage had four principal 
facets: a) the Government had to transfer to local governments half of all resources collected; 
b) the bulk of the resources had to be spent on health and education; c) elected governors and 
mayors had to administer their own resources and improve their fiscal situation; d) democracy 
had to be strengthened via the creation of participative mechanisms.49 The period in office of 
governors and mayors was increased from two to three years to improve local government 
continuity. 
 
The period from 1999 to 2001 was characterised as one of increasing decentralisation. A 
number of fiscal statutes were passed, including Law 549/1999 (the creation of the Regional 
Pension Fund), Law 617/2000 (the rationalisation of public spending in the regions) and Law 
619/2000 (which modified the 1994 municipal royalty law).50 In addition, the National 
Participation System was created to unify the old systems of departmental (Situado Fiscal) 
and municipal (participacion) transfers. 
 
. 
Decentralisation, State Presence and Municipal Resources 
The Government’s decision to give administrative responsibility to the municipalities led to 
sharp rises in local resources, especially from transfers (see Graph 4). Between 1982 and 
2002, total transfers went from 1.9% of GDP to almost 6%. This increase was due principally 
to the increase in municipal transfers, which went from 0.5% of GDP to 3.1%, thus 
superseding departmental transfers. Decentralised social spending rose considerably, mainly 
in education, health, social security and employment – public spending shot up during the 
1990s as a result. Local governments began to manage substantial resources, which made 
them an attractive source of financing for the irregular groups. 
 
The results of decentralisation are mixed in terms of political participation and institutional 
development. On the one hand, political decentralisation has been complemented by new 
political alternatives. In the first local elections in 1988, more than 85% of the mayors elect 
belonged to one of the two traditional parties. But these parties have subsequently lost their 
predominance to new coalitions, civil movements and independent candidates, who have won 
a high number votes in recent years.51 Similarly, the re-election of governors and mayors, 
introduced by the 1991 Constitution,  has given voters the ability to apply electoral sanctions 
or prizes. Between 1988 and 1997, the mayor was re-elected twice in 316 municipalities and 
three times in 20 municipalities, suggesting recognition of positive local government 
performance.52 
 
 
                                                
49 Alberto Alesina, Alberto Carrasquilla & Juan Echevarría, ‘Descentralización en Colombia’, in Reformas 
Institucionales en Colombia, Fedesarrollo- Alfaomega, 2002; DNP (2002a). 
50 Law 549/1999 established financing for regional pension liabilities and created the Nacional Regional Pension 
Fund. Law 617/2000 was designed to promote regional fiscal improvements, proposing an adjustment in 
regional spending and creating a new categorisation of municipalities and departments. 
51 In the 2003 elections, more than 55% of elected mayors belonged to movements or coalitions not connected to 
the two traditional parties.  
52 Alberto Maldonado, ‘Avances y resultados de la Descentralización política en Colombia’, Archivos de 
Economía, 163, Bogotá: National Planning Department, 2001. 
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Graph 4. Transfers (% of GDP), 1982-2002 
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Source: DNP, authors’ calculations.  
 
 
The results of the process were substantial in terms of education, health and public services. 
Education experienced huge advances during the 1990s. Literacy and educational coverage 
rose and there were improvements in the general quality of schooling. For example, 
secondary school coverage went from 48% in 1990 to 75% in 2000, mainly due to the 
increased capacity of state schools and the higher number of places for the poorest sector of 
the population, both in rural and urban areas.53 Additionally, more than 60% of the poorest 
families now have access to the subsidised health regime. There have also been improvements 
in access to water and sewerage services. In summary, the social achievements of 
decentralisation are numerous and, although there are important regional differences regards 
social reform, the ‘objective causes’ of the conflict (the cause of Collier’s grievances)54 have 
fallen considerably. 
 
 
The Effect of the Conflict on Local Government 
As stated above, decentralisation was accompanied by a huge rise in the intensity of the 
armed conflict. In a large number of municipalities the electoral process and the ability of 
local governments to govern was seriously restricted by irregular groups and political 
violence. Thus, more open municipal politics became the means by which the irregular groups 
refined their influence over the population and strengthened their territorial control. The 
groups influenced municipal politics in a number of different ways, amongst which figure: 
protecting favoured candidates, threatening and assassinating non-favoured candidates, and 
                                                
53 Fabio Sánchez & Jairo Núñez, ‘Descentralización, Pobreza y Acceso a los Servicios Sociales. ¿Quién se 
Beneficio del Gasto Publico en los Noventa?’, Documento CEDE 99-04, Bogotá: CEDE-Universidad de los 
Andes, 1999. 
54 Collier (2000). 
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threatening voters. This has damaged the electoral process, political participation and electoral 
legitimacy (elections with just one candidate) in a number of municipalities. The political 
pressure mentioned manifested itself through violence against candidates. According to 
presidential statistics, from 1988 to 2001 illegal armed groups assassinated 70 mayoral 
candidates, 92 council candidates and 14 candidates for other posts. 1997 was the worst year 
with a total of 57 assassinations, 100 kidnappings and 369 retirements from political life due 
to pressure from armed actors (see Graphs 5 and 6). 
 
 
Graph 5. Assassinations of Candidates, 1986-2001            
 
 
Source: Human Rights Observatory, Vice President’s Office.  
 
As we mentioned above, decentralisation gave greater administrative responsibilities and 
higher resources to municipalities. The illegal armed groups, in turn, used this situation to win 
control of local government and strengthen their economic, political and military strategies. 
As Rangel states: 
There is no doubt that the impact on municipal life of political, fiscal and 
administrative decentralisation did not go unnoticed by the guerrilla groups. They 
rapidly understood that the reforms made the municipalities new centres of 
regional power.55 
The reforms gave municipalities greater autonomy regards resource management, and this, 
added to their new political autonomy, made them attractive to the armed groups; they 
became a source of financing and political support. Additionally, the guerrilla forces tried to 
destabilise state institutions and hamper local management via armed pressure: 
                                                
55 Alfredo Rangel, ‘El poder local: objetivo actual de la guerrilla’, in Descentralización y Orden Publico, 
Bogotá: Fescol and Milenio, 1997, p.54. 
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the guerrilla forces wanted to … penetrate and control administrative agencies and 
regional and municipal government to condition, block and destabilise their 
actions and institutions.56  
The armed groups began to use ‘armed clientelism’ to appropriate public goods and resources 
via the use of violence. Similar to traditional clientelism, the irregular armed groups 
influenced the public contracting process and appropriated a percentage of municipal 
resources via contractor payments, amongst other things. The illegal groups, therefore, shaped 
the distribution of municipal public spending in many regions of the country.57 
 
Graph 6. Assassinations of Politicians, 1986-2001 
 
 
Source: Human Rights Observatory, Vice President’s Office. 
  
The ability to govern of many local governments has also been restricted by the actions of 
armed groups, who threaten, kidnap and assassinate local leaders and public-sector officials. 
This violence against the authorities shot up from 1988, when the popular election of mayors 
began. As can be seen in Graph 6, the use of violence intensified from this date and never 
returned to pre-decentralisation levels, when this type of political violence was almost 
unheard of.  
 
The statistics regards the threatening, kidnapping and assassination of local leaders and 
public-sector officials are alarming. According to the Confederation of Municipalities, in the 
recent past 554 mayors (about 50%) have been threatened, and many have had to recur to 
‘distance governing’. According to the Human Rights Observatory, between 1988 and 2001, 
                                                
56 Rangel (1997), p.55. 
57 Rangel (2001). 
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131 mayors, 461 councillors, 291 local political leaders, 185 union leaders and more than 550 
State functionaries were assassinated.58 
 
Romero argues that decentralisation did not have the desired effect of legitimising local 
governments and combating the armed conflict due to the characteristics of the conflict itself. 
Growing political responsibility led to increased political violence because it sharpened the 
rivalry between those demanding political change and those defending the status quo. Romero 
explains that violence against authorities and functionaries is the result of the armed groups’ 
political ambitions in the regions.59 More recently Duncan explained how the illegal self-
defence groups, with their Mafia-like structures, began to influence politics and contracting in 
urban areas via intimidation and violence.60 
 
The Armed Conflict and Justice: State Weakness 
The legal system has an important effect on criminal activity, as many studies have shown.61 
However, during armed conflict justice is weakened, which permits and facilitates the actions 
of the illegal armed groups. These groups affect the provision of justice by intimidating or 
assassinating judges and prosecutors, or creating congestion in the legal system by scaling up 
their activities. Thus the provision of justice affects the armed conflict, which in turn affects 
the provision of justice. 
 
Graph 7. Armed Activity and Judicial Efficiency, 1990-2000 
- . 2  
. 2  
. 4  
. 6  
. 8  
- 1  0  1 2 3
T a s a  d e  a ta q u e s  ( F A R C ,  E L N ,  A U C )  
 y  = . 2 7 1  +  - . 0 8 4 x  
( 7 . 2 2 )    ( - 2 . 0 3 )  
        R 2  =  . 1 2 1  
 
 
Source: DNP, Police, authors’ calculations. 
 
The judicial system could not respond to the escalating levels of armed activity in Colombia 
in the 1990s, and the provision of justice worsened. The evidence presented in Graph 7 
corroborates this affirmation as it shows the negative relationship between judicial efficiency 
                                                
58 Public-sector functionaries include police officers, legal functionaries, prison guards and others.  
59 Romero (2003). 
60 Gustavo Duncan, ‘Del campo a la ciudad en Colombia. La infiltración urbano de los señores de la guerra’, 
Documento CEDE. 2005-02. Bogotá: CEDE-Universidad de los Andes, 2005. 
61 Mauricio Rubio, Crimen e Impunidad, Bogotá: Tercer Mundo-Universidad de Los Andes, 1999; Mauricio 
Rubio, ‘Violencia y conflicto en los noventa’, Coyuntura Social, 22 (1999); Fabio Sánchez, Ana Maria Díaz & 
Michel Formisano, ‘Conflicto, Violencia y Actividad Criminal en Colombia: un Análisis Espacial’, Documento 
CEDE No. 2003-05, Bogotá: CEDE-Universidad de los Andes, 2003; Diaz & Sánchez (2004). These studies 
consider the provision of justice to be a determinant of violent crime (homicides and kidnappings) and illegal 
armed activity. 
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(the number of captures for homicide versus the number of homicides) and armed activity in 
the regions.62 It can be seen that departments with low levels of judicial efficiency 
experienced high levels of armed activity. Similarly, departments with high levels of armed 
activity experienced a greater deterioration in judicial efficiency – Arauca and Guaviare being 
the most dramatic cases.63 
 
To determine the effect of illegal armed activity on municipal judicial efficiency in 2003, we 
used matching estimators to create a municipal probability model.64 This allowed us to 
speculate on the level of municipal judicial efficiency there would have been without the 
presence of armed activity. We first estimated the probability of armed activity (FARC, ELN 
and AUC) for 2002, using geographical, socio-economic, economic, persistence and diffusion 
variables for armed activity. The estimated probability was then used to carry out the 
matching, using matching estimators: a control group of similar municipalities that did not 
experience armed activity, used to determine its effect on those that did (Table 1).            
 
Table 1. Differences in Judicial Efficiency as a Result of Illegal Armed Activity. 
 
Variable 
Study 
group 
average 
Control 
group 
average 
Difference 
0.0855 0.1004 -0.10148* Index of Municipal Judicial 
Efficiency    
No. Study: 556, Study: 448      
Matching Method neighbour     
*Significance: 95%    
 
Table 1 displays the results for judicial efficiency in 2003 in 1,004 municipalities, just short 
of the total number of municipalities in Colombia. According to the DNP and the President’s 
Office, at least one armed group was active in 448 municipalities in 2002. The difference 
between average judicial efficiency in these municipalities and the control group is negative 
and statistically significant. In the control group there were around 10 captures per 100 
crimes, whilst in the study group there were 8.5 captures per 100 crimes (15% fewer), or 71 
fewer captures compared to the control group. Multiplying this difference by the number of 
municipalities experiencing armed activity (448) generates a total of 31,808 captures, or 
approximately 12% of all captures in 2003. These results clearly show the negative effect of 
illegal armed activity on the efficiency of the judicial system. 
 
We can, therefore, conclude that local-level armed activity damages judicial efficiency via the 
intimidation of judges and police officers, congestion in the legal system and the creation of 
an environment of impunity for common criminals. A weak justice system is a prerequisite 
for the expansion of illegal groups’ influence on local and regional government and society. 
 
                                                
62 We took an average of regional armed activity and judicial efficiency for the period 1990-2000. 
63 Arauca experienced the highest rate of attacks, and judicial efficiency went from 10% in 1991 to 3.2% in 
2000. Guaviare also experienced an escalation in armed activity, and judicial efficiency went from 43% in  1989 
to 17% in 2000.                                                                                                                                                                                         
64 All captures in 2003 versus the number of crimes reported to the police.  
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Empirical Evidence on Decentralisation and the Conflict 
Methodology 
The methodology used had to include the time and geographical variables required by the 
study. Firstly, given the geographical nature of the dependant variables used in this 
investigation, there may be some correlation, be it with the dependant variable in 
neighbouring municipalities or the explicative variables related to municipal or departmental 
locations and neighbours. The activity of irregular groups in one municipality should be 
correlated with the activity of irregular groups in a neighbouring municipality with similar 
social conditions or violence generating factors, and econometric techniques should be used 
to capture these relationships. The activity of irregular groups depends not only on the 
characteristics of each municipality, but also on the activity and values of other variables in 
neighbouring municipalities.65  
 
The model used was the following: 
 
Yi,t = ρ*W1* Ys,t + Xi,t*β + Xs,t* W1*δ + ui,t;  (1) 
 
Where Yi,t represents armed activity in municipality i in year t, Ys,t represents armed activity in 
the neighbouring municipality s in year t,  the vector Xi,t  contains the explicative variables in 
municipality i in year t, and vector Xs,t contains the independent variables in neighbouring 
municipality s. The spatial correlation, measured by parameter ρ, is similar to the temporal 
auto-correlation observed in the time series. However, in time series this econometric problem 
is unidirectional; the past explains the present and can be easily resolved by the lag operator. 
In contrast, the spatial dependence is multi-directional – all the regions can affect each other, 
which motivates the implementation of a contiguous spatial matrix W1 (or spatial lag).66   
 
The use of this type of methodology and the integration of a contiguous matrix in the 
econometric models allowed us to capture the spatial diffusion and the contagious effects of 
illegal armed activity. Which means we can analyse the contagious effects of illegal armed 
activity in one municipality on another, as well as the influence of the independent variables 
of neighbouring spatial units on local dependant variables.  
 
We used spatial tobit models for the period from 1974 to 1982 to explain the rate by 
inhabitants (the number of illegal armed actions). For 1985-2002 we used probit spatial 
models to explain the presence or absence of each of the illegal armed groups (FARC, ELN 
and AUC) in a given municipality. 
 
                                                
65 The spatial auto-correlation of the dependant variable is not contemplated by Standard econometrics (MCO, 
transversal cut); this violates the principle of independent observations. This incorrect specification generates 
correlated residues, and thus invalidates the results of statistical inferences based on the t-student test and, at the 
same time, increases the R2 value.  
66 A contiguity matrix for N geographical units of size (NxN) with zero diagonal values (one cannot talk of the 
vicinity of a geographical unit to itself) and the other elements of the matrix include vicinity criteria between the 
other spatial variables  Ni and Nj (for i≠j). These values are different according to the vicinity criteria used. If the 
matrix used is 1/Distance, the elements i and j of the matrix, for i different to j, fill up with the inverse of the 
distance between the two municipalities i and j, so that the furthest geographical units have lower values. If the 
matrix used is binary 1km, only those elements of the matrix where the distance between census sectors is less 
than 1km fill up, and the rest of the matrix is full of zeros. The diagonal is filled with zeros and then all the 
matrixes are standardised horizontally, so that each horizontal sum of the elements in the matrix adds up to 1. 
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The Data 
The different econometric exercises all have a dependant variable, whether it be the rate of 
illegal armed activity from 1974 to 1982, or the presence of activity (as a 1 or 0 variable) 
between 1985 and 2002. As mentioned above, we used tobit spatial methodology for the first 
period and probit for the second. This variable was constructed using IEPRI information on 
the activities of armed groups for the period prior to 1982. 
 
The explicative variables for activity from 1974 to 1982 are municipal socio-economic 
variables, including unsatisfied basic needs (UBN), sewerage, energy and education, from the 
1973 census. Municipal income and the presence of mining resources (gold) were used as 
variables of municipal wealth or development. The state presence variable was constructed 
using judicial efficiency, measured as the relationship between captures for homicide and the 
number of homicides (police data). The control factor for the history of municipal  illegal 
armed activity was the intensity of the Violencia Tardía (1958-1962) calculated by Chacón 
and Sánchez.67  
 
The explicative variables for the presence or absence of the three most important armed 
groups from 1985 to 2002 have been divided into socio-economic variables (UBN, Gini land 
ownership coefficient, primary and secondary educational coverage), wealth and economic 
activity variables (oil, cattle, coca crops, municipal transfers), state presence variables 
(electoral participation, political representation, judicial efficiency), geographical variables, 
and temporal and spatial lag variables. The data for the explicative and dependant variables 
was taken from different sources (the President’s Office, the National Planning Department, 
the Agustín Codazzi Geography Institute, the Dane, and the National Registrar). 
 
The Results  
1. The Early Activities of Armed Groups: 1974-1978 
The results of the econometric exercises designed to explain the activities of irregular armed 
groups from 1974 to 1978 and 1979 to 1982 are presented in Table 2. The level of armed 
activity from 1974-1978 is positively associated with poverty, measured by the Index of 
Unsatisfied Basic Needs (UBN), and inequality, measured as variance in municipal 
educational coverage. Primary educational coverage has a negative effect. State presence, 
measured by judicial efficiency, has the expected negative effect. The wealth variables, 
measured by per capital municipal tax collections and the presence of gold, have the expected 
positive value, although only the presence of gold is statistically significant. 
 
The results show a strong spatial correlation or contagious effect; 0.22 of the level of armed 
activity is passed on to the neighbouring municipality. The results suggest that if a 
municipality experienced violence during the Violencia Tardía (1958-1965) it was more 
susceptible to the activities of irregular groups between  1974 and 1978. 
 
The results corroborate the hypothesis that, at its outset, the conflict could be explained by 
exclusion and poverty, as explained by the statistical significance of the poverty and 
inequality variable. The conflict was centred on areas where the peasant self-defence groups, 
which were the seeds of the guerrilla movement, had formed at the end of the 1950s and start 
of the 1960s. 
                                                
67 Mario Chacón & Fabio Sánchez, ‘Violencia y Polarización Política durante La Violencia, 1948-1965’, mimeo, 
Universidad de Los Andes, 2004. 
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Table 2. Rate of Illegal Activities (Tobit 1974-1978) 
 
Social Conditions  
UBN 1.10   *** 
Primary education coverage -2.59  *** 
Educational variance 0.70   *** 
Sewerage 1.72   *** 
  
State Presence  
Judicial efficiency -0.88  *** 
Tax per capita 1973            0.01 
  
Economic Activity  
Presence of gold 0.38     * 
  
Spatial Variables  
Spatial lag 0.22   *** 
  
Violence  
Violencia Tardía (1958-1965) 0.32     * 
  
Constant -1.74   *** 
Number of observations 942 
Methodology Spatial tobit 
Dummies years *** 
***  significant 99%,  ** significant 95%,  *significant 90% 
 
 
 
2. The Activities of Armed Groups: 1985 – 2002 
The probability determinants for the presence of illegal armed activity (FARC, ELN and 
AUC) between 1985 and 2002 are presented in Table 3. In the case of FARC activity, it can 
be seen that of the socio-economic variables only secondary education has the expected 
negative sign. Primary education has a positive effect. The effect of poverty, although 
positive, is not statistically significant. Land ownership has a negative effect, contrary to our 
‘objective cause’ expectations. This may be due to the way the FARC expanded its activities 
from the south of the country, where large landholdings are common, to the mountainous west 
of the country, where properties are smaller.68  
 
The economic variables are all positive and statistically significant. A guerrilla presence, oil 
extraction and cattle farming all influence the probability of FARC armed activity. A similar 
thing happens with coca growing – it increases the probability of FARC activity in the 
municipality. Government transfers to the municipality have a positive, significant effect on 
                                                
68 According to Reyes, areas of small landholdings in the Andean region have not suffered agrarian conflict since 
the mid-1980s. They have, however, been the object of guerrilla and paramilitary activity and there have been 
confrontations between these groups and the army (Alejandro Reyes, ‘La cuestión agraria en la guerra y la paz’, 
in Alvaro Camacho & Francisco Leal (eds), Armar la paz es desarmar la guerra, Bogotá: IEPRI-FESCOL-
CEREC, Giro Editores, 1999). 
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FARC activity. Wealth and economic activity follow the line of thinking developed by 
Collier, related to civil wars in various countries,69 and Bottia, related directly to Colombia.70 
 
Table 3. Illegal Armed Activity (activity = 1, no activity = 0)  
 
 
Illegal Armed Group  FARC ELN Self-Defences 
Socio-economic Conditions 
UBN 0.0003       0.0003          0.0008  **
Gini Land Ownership -0.1196   ***     -0.0430    ** 0.0112 
Primary Education coverage 0.0252   *** -0.0048 -0.005 
Secondary Education coverage -0.0391    ** 0.0019   0,0144 
Economic Activity 
Presence of Oil 0.0322   *** -0.0009 0.0294     * 
Presence of Cattle 0.0454   ***         0.0199   *** 0.0382   *** 
Cultivation of Coca 0.0025     * -0.0015 0.0041    ** 
Transfers 0.0501   ***         0.0421   *** 0.0509   *** 
State Presence 
Judicial Efficiency -0.0872   ***       -0.0687   ***        -0.2242   ***
Electoral Participation -0.1907   ***       -0.0577   ***        -0.1404   ***
Political Representation -0.0894   *** 0.0261         0,0338 
Geographic Variables 
Altitude         0.0064  **         0.0056 *** -0.0039 
Distance from the capital 0.000 0.000 -0.0001 
Temporal-spatial dynamics 
Temporal lag 1 0.1850   *** 0.1331   *** 0.1679   ***
Temporal lag 2 0.0692   *** 0.0713   *** 0.0590   ***
Temporal lag 3 0.0759   *** 0.0722   *** 0.0349    **
Spatial lag FARC 0.3893   *** 0.3102   *** 0.0135   ***
R 2 0.2504 0.3493 0.1561 
Number of Observations 13029 14070 5203 
Methodology Spatial tobit Spatial tobit Spatial tobit 
Dummies Years Yes *** Yes *** Yes *** 
FARC & ELN: 1985-2002; Self-Defences: 1995-2002 
***  99% significance,  ** 95% significance,  * 90% significance  
 
 
We also corroborated the hypothesis that increased municipal resources and political power 
following decentralisation led to the conflict becoming a dispute for local power, and that it 
facilitated a rise in armed activity. The state presence and political activity variables have the 
                                                
69 Collier (2000). 
70 Bottia (2003). 
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expected signs. The effect of judicial efficiency is negative and highly significant. Electoral 
participation and the level of mayoral support (the number of votes for the winner versus total 
votes) have a negative effect on FARC armed activity. High electoral participation and 
political support are indications of the legitimacy of local governments, and hamper, to a 
certain extent, the activities of illegal armed groups. 
 
In terms of the temporal dynamic, there is a high level of temporal persistence in FARC 
municipal activity; a municipality that has experienced FARC activity in the past is likely to 
experience FARC activity in the present. The contagious effect is high and significant – the 
probability of FARC activity in a given municipality rises by close to 40% if the group is 
active in neighbouring municipalities. 
 
As regards the ELN, Table 3 shows that socio-economic variables have no statistically 
significant effect on their activities, with the exception of the Gini property coefficient, which 
has a sign opposite to that expected based on the ‘objective cause’ hypothesis. The 
explanation for this is similar to that of the FARC. Wealth and income (cattle ranching and 
municipal transfers) have a positive, statistically significant effect on ELN activity. Once 
again, the positive, significant effect of municipal transfers is a clear result of decentralisation. 
In terms of state presence and political development, both judicial efficiency and electoral 
participation have the expected negative effect on ELN activity, as they did with the FARC. 
ELN activity also has a very significant persistent (temporal dynamic) and contagious (spatial 
dynamic) effect, although less so than for the FARC. 
 
The models for AUC activity were generated for 1995-2002, due to the fact that systematic 
municipal information is only available for this period. Table 3 shows that socio-economic 
variables have no statistically significant effect. Only poverty (UBN) has a negative effect. 
All of the wealth and resource indicators have the expected positive sign; the existence of oil, 
cattle ranching and coca crops all incentivise AUC activity. Once again, the size of municipal 
transfers has a significant effect on the activity of this group. State presence and local 
electoral participation negatively affect the probability of AUC activity, and were, in fact, of a 
higher (negative) magnitude than in the case of the FARC and the ELN. Again, the positive, 
significant effect of transfers on AUC activity stands out. 
 
The AUC temporal-spatial dynamics behave differently to those of the other two groups. 
Although there is strong temporal persistence (similar to the ELN and less than the FARC), 
the contagious effect is very low (just 0.013, compared to 0.38 for the FARC and 0.31 for the 
ELN). 
 
 
3. The Expansion of the Conflict, 1985-1992 / 1993-2002 
With a view to determining the variables that explain the expansion and intensification of the 
conflict, we carried out an additional econometric exercise on the FARC and the ELN (this 
was not possible for the AUC due to the lack of data). The dependant variable is the average 
annual change in activities between 1985 and 1992 and 1993 and 2000. For example, if from 
1985-1992 a municipality experienced ELN or FARC activity in four of the eight years, its 
indicator for the period would be 0.5. If from 1993-2000 the municipality experienced activity 
in seven of the eight years, its indicator would be 0.875 – an intensification of 0.375. Thus, 
municipalities that went from 0 to a positive value (between 0 and 1) were part of the 
expansion of the conflict and municipalities that went from a positive number to a higher 
positive were part of the intensification of the conflict. 
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Table 4. The Expansion of Guerrilla Groups 
 
Guerrilla Group FARC ELN 
Socio-economic Conditions 
UBN (average 1985-1992) 0.0004 0.0004 
Gini Land Ownership (average 1985-92)      -0.0972  **      -0.0878  ** 
Primary Education coverage  (average 1985-92) -0.0039 0.0053 
Secondary Education coverage  (average 1985-92)       -0.0825  ** 0.000 
Economic Activity 
Presence of oil 0.0017 -0.0354  ** 
Presence of cattle 0.0162 0.011 
Cultivation of coca (average 1985-92)       -0.0169   * 0.0065 
Cultivation of coca (difference) 0.0254 0.0280 
Transfers (average 1985-92)        0.078  ***        0.0595  *** 
Transfers (difference)       0.0510  ***        0.0571  *** 
State Presence 
Judicial Efficiency (average 1985-92) -0.0671 -0.0040 
Electoral Participation (average 1985-92) 0.002 -0.0406 
Political Representation (average 1985-92) 0.0074 0.0095 
Geographic Variables 
Altitude         0.0111** 0.0033 
Distance from capital 0.0000 0.0000 
Temporal-Spatial Dynamics 
FARC activity (average 1985-92)      -0.5180  ***        0.0540   * 
ELN activity  (average 1985-92)        0.1450  ***       -0.5182  *** 
Spatial lag FARC (average 1985-92)        0.5345  *** -0.0744 
Spatial lag FARC (expansion)       0.8182  *** 0.0293 
Spatial lag ELN (average 1985-92)      -0.2506  ***        0.5310  *** 
Spatial lag ELN (expansion) -0.017        0.9070*** 
R 2 0.3684 0.444 
Number of observations 997 997 
Methodolgy Spatial OLS Spatial OLS 
                FARC & ELN: 1985-1992/ 1993-2002 
***  99% significance,  ** 95% significance,  * 90% significance 
Expansion = average 1993-2000 – average 1985-1992 
 
 
The results presented in Table 4 show the effects of the different variables on the expansion 
and intensification of the conflict. The explicative variables are average for the period 1985-
1992. Amongst the socio-economic variables, poverty has no statistically significant effect on 
the expansion of FARC and ELN activities. The Gini land ownership coefficient negatively 
affects the expansion and intensification of the conflict, implying that both groups moved 
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towards areas with lower concentrations of land ownership (as we mentioned previously, this 
is due to that fact that the expansion was towards the mountainous west of the country where 
properties are smaller), and is consistent with what we observed as regards the early conflict 
(1974-1982) in zones of greater inequality. Higher levels of access to secondary education 
between 1985 and 1992 had a negative effect on the expansion and intensification of FARC 
activity, but not on that of the ELN. 
 
We found that oil and cattle ranching could not be linked to the expansion and intensification 
of the conflict from 1993 to 2000. Both groups began their activities in regions where these 
economic activities were prevalent (which is consistent with the previous section’s findings), 
but the fact that no new regions appeared meant that there was nowhere new for the groups to 
expand into. The presence of coca growing between 1985 and 1992 is negatively associated 
with the expansion and intensification of FARC activities. This is due to the fact that the 
FARC were already active in coca-growing zones. This result has been corroborated by other 
studies, using different methodologies, that have found that the expansion of coca growing is 
preceded by the activities of illegal armed groups.71 
 
Both the initial level of transfers, and their growth from 1985-2002, had a positive, significant 
effect on the expansion and intensification of FARC and ELN activity. This concurs with our 
hypothesis that institutional changes and greater local political and budgetary autonomy 
facilitated the expansion and intensification of the irregular groups’ activities. 
 
None of the State presence variables had a statistically significant effect on the expansion of 
FARC or ELN activities between 1985 and 1992. Amongst the geographic variables, only 
altitude is positively and significantly associated with FARC expansion, which could be 
explained by this group’s pattern of expansion towards the west of the country. 
 
The previous activity variables for 1985-1992, as much in individual municipalities as in 
neighbouring municipalities, and the expansion of the groups into neighbouring 
municipalities between 1993 and 2002, have an effect on the expansion and intensification of 
the conflict. If average FARC activity between 1985 and 2002 was positive, it reduced by 0.5 
between 1993 and 2002, which implies that, ceteris paribus, once a certain level of territorial 
control has been achieved by earlier activities, future levels of activity decline. The same 
pattern is observed for the ELN. Additionally, in municipalities where the ELN were active 
between 1985 and 1992, FARC activity expanded between 1993 and 2000. The same is true 
mutatis mutandis for the ELN, although the ELN’s response between 1993 and 2002 to FARC 
activity between 1985 and 1992 is much lower (0.05) than the FARC’s response to ELN 
activity (0.14).  
 
Previous activity in neighbouring municipalities and the expansion of groups into 
neighbouring municipalities is positively associated with the intensification of the conflict, as 
much for the FARC as the ELN. For both groups, half of all activity between 1985 and 1992 
was transferred to (or ‘caught’ by) neighbouring municipalities between 1993 and 2000. In 
terms of expansion, there was also a high rate of transmission to neighbours; 0.8 of FARC 
expansion and 0.9 of ELN expansion was transmitted to neighbouring municipalities. The 
cross-referenced spatial effects are only statistically significant (negative) for the effect of 
ELN activity between 1985-1992 on FARC expansion. 
 
                                                
71 Díaz & Sánchez (2004). 
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An Explanation of the Conflict’s Geographical Expansion 
1. Changes in the Probability of Illegal Armed Activity 
Once we had completed the econometric exercises for the determinants of the illegal armed 
groups’ activities, it became necessary to analyse the relative contribution of each of the 
geographic expansion variables of the conflict in recent years (the increased probability of 
armed activity). We employed a simple decomposition exercise using the following equation: 
 
∑ −− −=− )(, ,, ittkkitkt XXPORCPORC β  (2) 
 
Where PORC is the percentage of municipalities that experienced illegal armed activity in 
time t and t-i. This means that the change in the percentage of municipalities in which group k 
was active corresponds to the sum of the difference of each explicative variable multiplied by 
its respective coefficient βk. For time t average activity in 1998/2000 is used, and for time t-i 
average activity in 1988/1990.  
 
Graph 8. The Changing Probability of FARC Activity: 1988/90 – 1998/00 
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The FARC, for example, were active in 10% of municipalities between 1988 and 1990, a 
figure that rose to 29% for 1998/2000. Graph 8 displays the effect of each of the explicative 
variables on the increased probability of FARC activity. It can be seen that the variable with 
the greatest effect on the expansion of FARC armed activity was municipal transfers, an 
indicator of decentralisation having provided higher resources to municipalities. The next 
most important aspect is the contagious effect, which shows that FARC activity tends to spill-
over into neighbouring municipalities. The temporal persistence of FARC activity also 
explains, in part, the expansion of this group. Municipalities that experienced FARC activity 
in the past are more susceptible to experience activity in the present. The other activities that 
explain to some degree the increased probability of FARC activity are the presence of illicit 
crops in the department and weak municipal electoral participation.72 Municipalities in which 
                                                
72 The future weakening is due to the activities of armed groups (Sanchez & Díaz, 2004). The way in which 
weak participation in previous elections facilitates the actions of irregular groups is examined. 
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political participation fell from one election to the next experienced higher increases in the 
probability of FARC expansion. However, the negative, statistically insignificant socio-
economic variables had little effect on the increased probability of FARC activity. 
 
As regards the probability of ELN activity from 1988/1990 to 1998/2000, it can be largely 
explained by municipal transfers (Graph 9), followed by coca growing and contagiousness. 
The socio-economic variables did not have an important effect on the increased probability of 
ELN activity in the period in question. 
 
Graph 9. The Changing Probability of ELN Activity: 1988/90 – 1998/00 
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Graph 10. The Changing Probability of AUC Activity: 1995/96 – 1999/00  
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Finally, the variables associated with the increased probability of AUC activity from 1995/96 
to 1999/2000 were municipal resources or transfers, the presence of coca growing and 
temporal persistence (Graph 10). The other variables had a lower impact. 
 
 
2. The Expansion of the FARC and the ELN 
To conclude the previous exercise we determined the relative contribution of each of the 
variables in Table 4 to FARC and ELN expansion. The relative contribution of each variable 
was calculated using the following equation: 
 
Contribution  % of Xk =( βk* PROM(Xk))/PROM(Y)  (5) 
 
Where the relative contribution is defined as the coefficient of variable Xk in the regression 
multiplied by its average divided by the average of the dependant variable Y, which, in this 
case, is FARC or ELN expansion. The average value for each variable in 1985-1992 and 
1993-2000 is shown in Appendix 1. The descriptive statistics show that FARC activity went 
from 0.125 in 1985-1992 to 0.265 in 1993-2000,73 and ELN activity went from 0.10 to 0.15. 
A similar pattern was observed for the neighbouring municipalities. 
 
The results of the decomposition exercise can be seen in Graphs 10 and 11 – FARC and ELN 
respectively. The initial transfers variable (1985-1992) makes the highest contribution to the 
expansion of these groups (more than 800% for the FARC and more than 900% for the ELN), 
followed by the increase or change in transfers (more than 100% for the FARC and more than 
200% for the ELN).  
 
 
Graph 11. The Expansion of the FARC: 1985-1992 / 1993-2002  
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73 This means that from 1985 to 1992 Colombian municipalities experienced the activities of these groups once 
every 8 years on average, a figure that went up to more than 2 during 1993-2000.  
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The contagious effects also help explain 61% of FARC and 81% of ELN expansion. 
Furthermore, expansion in neighbouring municipalities contributes to 100% of local 
municipality expansion for the FARC and 68% for the ELN. The initial activities of both 
groups contribute negatively to their expansion (FARC: -57%, and ELN: -75%). Other 
variables with some level of impact are the presence of coca growing between 1985 and 1992 
(173% FARC and 100% ELN – Graphs 11 and 12). The socio-economic variables had a low 
effect on the expansion of these two groups. Finally, amongst the geographical variables only 
altitude had a positive effect (61%) on the expansion of FARC activity.  
 
 
Graph 12. The expansion of the ELN: 1985-1992 / 1993-2002  
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The results of the decompositions show how higher municipal resources – the product of 
political, administrative and budgetary decentralisation – were the most important 
determinant of the probability of irregular groups’ activity and expansion. Thus fiscal and 
political decentralisation provided resources for the irregular groups to plunder, and 
opportunities for local level intimidation due to the repressive inability of the municipalities. 
This gave the groups the opportunity they needed to consolidate their territorial power. In 
addition, the State’s poor capacity of response as regards the provision of justice and the 
prevention of violent activities facilitated the actions of the illegal groups. 
 
 
Conclusions  
Since the mid-1980s the Colombian conflict has escalated rapidly, expressed as much by the 
number of attacks and level of illegal armed activity, as by the increased geographical 
coverage of their activities. Part of the explanation for these increases is in the improved 
sources of financing the groups enjoyed (kidnapping, extortion, illicit crops and drug-
trafficking). However, to better understand the dynamics of the conflict (especially 
considering its long-term nature), one must take into account the institutional changes that 
redefined the strategic objectives of the illegal groups. The most important change (starting in 
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the mid-1980s) was the fiscal, administrative and political decentralisation process that turned 
the conflict into a dispute for local power. 
  
This study used conflict statistics dating back to the early-1970s. The evidence shows that 
until 1985 the number of attacks and municipal coverage were low – just 12% of 
municipalities experienced illegal armed activity between 1974 and 1982. The econometric 
evidence, in turn, shows that the conflict (in terms of the activities of current guerrilla groups) 
can be explained to a large degree by socio-economic indicators of poverty and inequality, 
and also by contagiousness and the violent tendencies inherited from La Violencia of the 
1950s and 60s. 
 
From 1985 the intensity and geographical coverage of the conflict increased. This is explained 
by the fact that the guerrilla groups, especially the FARC, constructed organisations that were 
capable of collecting and investing enormous the economic resources that came from 
substantial, stable sources (plundering productive activities, kidnapping and the drug trade). 
The ELN designed a political-military strategy based on occupying regions with high 
economic potential, especially mines and energy, but with a low state presence that enabled 
them to exploit the local resources and win popular support. Finally, the AUC managed to 
consolidate their objectives in the fight to win control of strategic territories of great economic 
importance to the guerrilla groups, with whom they fought for economic resources whilst 
terrorising the population via massacres and collective assassinations of groups they accused 
of sympathising with the guerrilla forces. 
 
The results of the econometric exercises show that the greater part of the increased activity 
and expansion of the Colombian conflict since the mid-1980s (and especially in the 1990s) 
can be attributed to stronger sources of financing (greed), and very little to ‘objective 
conditions’ (grievance).74 In both cases (guerrilla and paramilitary) access to sources of 
financing explains a good part of the geographical expansion of activities. The weak justice 
system was also a key factor for the groups; the probability of being caught was (and still is) 
extremely low. 
 
However, this explanation of the conflict is a little hollow; it does not take into account the 
redefinition of the groups’ strategic objectives, nor the way decentralisation modified the 
means to achieve them. In fact, the entire rationality of action in the fight for power changed 
when the institutional framework of the State they were trying to destroy changed – when 
power is decentralised, and transferred to local institutions, it becomes more vulnerable to 
external influences.  
 
The statistics show that in a high number of municipalities the electoral process and 
government management were seriously restricted by the political violence meted out against 
candidates, functionaries and leaders – and that the violence shot up from 1988, the first year 
mayoral elections were held. Local government management was restricted by pressure from 
the armed groups and ‘armed clientelism’ appeared (using violence to appropriate state 
resources). Thus, the illegal armed groups controlled (and continue to control) the distribution 
of public spending and municipal investment. 
 
The results confirm that the variables connected to municipal politics, electoral participation 
and popular support for mayors determine the presence or not of illegal armed activity. This, 
in turn, shows that there is a clear relationship between the armed conflict and political 
                                                
74 Collier (2000). 
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decentralisation. In addition, the empirical results and the decomposition exercises reveal a 
strong connection between greater local government independence and fiscal strength and the 
intensification of the conflict. This corroborates our hypothesis that decentralisation turned 
the conflict into a dispute for local power, manifested in the use of violence to gain control of 
public goods and services, influence political and electoral results of interest to the irregular 
groups, and consolidate local territorial control. 
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